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7.1 Introduction
Globalization is about the changing costs of economic interactions
across distance and the eﬀects of these changes on the geographical distri-
bution of economic activity. Technical change has been driving the costs of
interactions steadily downward for many centuries, although policy inter-
ventions have sometimes raised them. Changes in the economic geography
of the world economy have been more complex. There have been periods
when activity has become more unevenly distributed across space, and pe-
riods when these spatial diﬀerences have narrowed as activity has spread
from established centers into other regions and countries.
The mechanisms driving these changes were, among other things, easier
movement of people, capital, and goods—“globalization.” But why did the
location of economic activity evolve in the way it has? Why did the world
not develop some quite diﬀerent economic geography, with diﬀerent centers
of production, or with activity more evenly distributed? Many factors are
important, but in this chapter we highlight the role of geography. This in-
cludes the “ﬁrst-nature” geography of oceans, rivers, mountains, and en-
dowments, although our focus will be mainly on the “second-nature” geo-
graphy of the spatial interaction between economic agents. The essence of
globalization is that it changes these spatial interactions.
Most traditional analyses are based on economic models in which there




Nicholas Crafts and Anthony J. Venables
Nicholas Crafts is professor of economic history at the London School of Economics. An-
thony J. Venables is professor of international economics at the London School of Economics.
The authors thank the conference participants, particularly Richard Baldwin and Jeﬀ
Williamson. the wage in the host country, and an increase in manufacturing output en-
counters increasing costs. We argue in this paper that it is not possible to in-
terpret several of the most important aspects of economic development in
such a framework. An alternative is provided by models of “new trade the-
ory” and “new economic geography” in which market imperfections at the
micro level can give rise to increasing returns at a more aggregate level. The
balance between increasing and decreasing returns in these models depends
crucially on spatial interactions (determining, for example, the extent of the
market) and changes in these interactions can have major eﬀects. Global-
ization can trigger cumulative causation processes that cause uneven devel-
opment to occur at a variety of diﬀerent spatial levels—urban, regional,
and international.
Our objective in this paper is to apply this new approach to several aspects
of the historical experience of globalization. We proceed in three stages.
First we sketch out some of the facts about the changing location of activity
and the way that spatial interactions between economic agents changed over
time. There were dramatic falls in the costs of moving goods, people, and in-
formation, occurring particularly from the 1870s onward. The falling costs
were associated with large increases in trade relative to income, narrowing
of international price gaps, and increases in migration ﬂows. Second, we
outline theoretical approaches to thinking about the consequences of these
changes. One approach is the neoclassical model of production and trade,
in which production is determined by factor endowments, technological
diﬀerences, and the freeness of trade. We contrast this with a new economic
geography approach, in which locations derive some of their comparative
advantage from scale, and ability to exploit scale is in turn limited by the ex-
tent of the market. In this approach ﬁrms seeking proﬁtable locations will
be drawn to locations with good market access and proximity to clusters of
related activities, as well as locations with appropriate factor endowments.
We show that this alternative view provides a broad-brush picture that, in
many respects, seems consistent with the historical record.
We then turn to look in more detail at several historical episodes. From
the nineteenth century we focus on the rise of New World economies and
the development of urbanization. We confront the central issue of early
twentieth-century economic history, namely how the United States came to
overtake other regions, and argue that insights from new economic geo-
graphy can shed important light on this change. From the late twentieth
century we revisit the East Asian “miracle,” the most spectacular shift of the
center of gravity in the world economy since the rise of the United States.
In pursuing the theme that geography matters for economic development
we are consciously swimming against the tide of recent work both in eco-
nomic history and in growth economics. Economic historians, notably in
the new institutional economic history (North 1990), have stressed the im-
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that divergence stems from the path dependency of institutional arrange-
ments. Endogenous growth models also tend to underline the centrality of
microeconomic foundations for growth outcomes (Aghion and Howitt
1998), whereas neoclassical growth economists still believe in ultimate
(twenty-ﬁrst-century) convergence, following a post–Industrial Revolution
interlude of divergence due to lags in the diﬀusion of best practice institu-
tions, policies, and technology (Lucas 2000). Our position is that these con-
ventional wisdoms are signiﬁcantly modiﬁed by taking into account the
way that changing costs of distance interact with economies of scale to
shape the economic geography of the world.
A stylized version of this alternative perspective can be outlined as fol-
lows. If trade costs are very high then economic activity must be dispersed,
whereas if trade costs are very low then ﬁrms will not care whether they are
close to markets and suppliers. At intermediate levels of trade costs, how-
ever, the likelihood of agglomeration is high. Agglomeration forces operat-
ing through linkages across a wide range of activities will cause the world to
divide into an industrialized rich center and deindustrialized poor periph-
ery even if there are no diﬀerences in institutional quality or economic pol-
icy. Over time a number of mechanisms, including falling trade costs and
growing world demand for manufactures, will make a new location outside
the center become competitive, so industry moves there and it now beneﬁts
from agglomeration eﬀects. Following the initial agglomeration phase, de-
velopment therefore takes the form of enlargement of the set of countries in
the center. This is not a process of steady convergence of poor countries to
rich ones but rather the rapid transition of selected countries (close to or
with good transport links to the center) from the poor to the rich club.
7.2 Location and Trade Costs: The Historical Record
In 1750 more than 50 percent of the world’s industrial output was pro-
duced in China and India, compared to some 18 percent in Western Eu-
rope. The following eighty years saw the Industrial Revolution, with west-
ern Europe’s industrial output more than doubling and that of the United
Kingdom increasing by a factor of 7. Over the same period, industrial pro-
duction in China and India continued to increase (by around 20 percent). It
is not our purpose to analyze the origins of the Industrial Revolution but in-
stead to study the changing economic geography of the world from this
point on. The technological changes that resulted from the industrial revo-
lution, notably in the form of the harnessing of steam power, not only raised
European industrial output but also facilitated large reductions in both in-
land and ocean transport costs associated with the coming of the railroad
and the steamship.
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Figure 7.1 shows the shares of world gross domestic product (GDP) at-
tributable to major regions of the world economy at selected dates from
1820 onward, and ﬁgure 7.2 gives shares of industrial production for the
same regions from 1750 on. Three main phases are apparent in both ﬁgures,
although they are more pronounced for industrial production than for
GDP as a whole. The ﬁrst phase is the rise of the United Kingdom and west-
ern Europe as a whole and the dramatic collapse of China and India from
these start dates through to the latter part of the nineteenth century. This
period saw not only a decline of industrial production in China and India
relative to the rest of the world but also an absolute fall such that 1830s lev-
els were not regained until the 1930s (Bairoch 1982). The second phase is the
rise of North America. Its share of world GDP and industrial output in-
creased most rapidly from the American Civil War to the start of the Great
Depression, peaking shortly after World War II. The third phase is revealed
in the data for 1998 but has its origins in the postwar “golden age” of
growth, namely, the large and rapid increase in the shares of Japan, China,
and other East Asian countries in world GDP and industrial output.1
These phases correspond ﬁrst to a concentration of activity in the United
Kingdom and northwestern Europe (phase I), and then to two diﬀerent
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Fig. 7.1 Regions’ share of world GDP
Source: Maddison (2001).
1. A complementary perspective on geographic aspects of catch-up and convergence is set
out in Dowrick and DeLong, chapter 4 in this volume.phases of dispersion, ﬁrst to North America (phase II), and then to parts of
Asia (phase III). Figure 7.3, which reports shares of world population, un-
derlines the tendencies toward concentration, especially in industrial pro-
duction, which became apparent during and after the nineteenth century.
Whereas in the 1820s China and India accounted for a little over half the
world’s population and a little under half of world GDP and industrial pro-
duction, by 1913 western Europe and North America, with about one-ﬁfth
of the world’s population, produced over half of world GDP and nearly
three-quarters of world industrial output. By 1998, with a rather smaller
share of world population, these countries still accounted for well over half
of world industrial output, whereas China and India, with over 40 percent
of world population, produced only about 8 percent of industrial output.
Figure 7.4 reports manufacturing exports (from 1876–80 onward). Here
there is evidence of even more concentrated activity. In the late nineteenth
century the United Kingdom looms very large with over a third of all ex-
ports, even though only representing about 2.5 percent of world popula-
tion. It was then superseded as the world’s leading exporter by the rise of
North America, which accounted for over a quarter of manufactured ex-
ports in 1955 with only about 6 percent of world population. (Europe looks
large in the ﬁgure relative to the United States, essentially because intra-
European trade is reported, in contrast to intra-U.S. trade). The remarkable
feature of the last decades of the twentieth century was the rise of Chinese,
Japanese, and other East Asian manufactured exports, representing a real
breakthrough for newly industrializing countries.
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Fig. 7.2 Regions’ share in world industrial production
Sources: Bairoch (1982); UN (1965); UNIDO (2001).Fig. 7.3 Regions’ share in world population
Source: Maddison (2001).
Fig. 7.4 Regions’ share in world manufactured exports
Sources: UNCTAD (1983, 2000); Yates (1959).7.2.2 The History of Transport Costs
Although distance remains a barrier even at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst
century, the continuing communications revolution has been one of the
most outstanding features of the last 200 years. Table 7.1reports on the cost
of ocean shipping for selected years since 1750. The period between 1830
and 1910 emerges as the era of very substantial decreases, and by the late
twentieth century ocean shipping rates in real terms were about one-sixth
of the level of the early nineteenth century.2
Ocean shipping is only a small part of the story, however, especially for
the nineteenth century. This was also a period of spectacular declines in in-
land transport costs, which between 1800 and 1910 fell by over 90 percent
(Bairoch 1990, 142). After World War II, however, new modes of transport
became important, and by 1980 the real costs of airfreight had fallen to
about a quarter of its level on the eve of World War II (Dollar 2001).
Trends in barriers to trade created by policymakers also need to be taken
into account. Here the broad trends are well known even though details are
sometimes elusive. The estimate of the unweighted world average tariﬀ rate
given by Clemens and Williamson (2001) and illustrated in ﬁgure 7.5 rises
from about 12 percent in 1865 to 17 percent in 1910. In the interwar period,
at a time when transport costs had ceased falling, trade wars pushed the
Clemens-Williamson tariﬀ rate up to 25 percent at its 1930s peak, and, in
addition, quantitative trade restrictions proliferated, aﬀecting perhaps 50
percent of world trade (Gordon 1941). After World War II, the Clemens-
Williamson tariﬀ rate is in the 12–15 percent range, where it remains until
the 1970s, after which it falls to a low of 7–8 percent in the late 1990s. The
quantitative restrictions of the 1930s and 1940s among the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries were largely
removed in the postwar liberalization phase, and despite a revival in the era
of voluntary export restraints in the 1970s and 1980s, post–Uruguay Round
Globalization in History: A Geographical Perspective 329










Sources: Derived using Dollar (2001), Harley (1988), and Isserlis (1938).
2. A much more detailed account of this phenomenon can be found in Findlay and
O’Rourke, chapter 1 in this volume.these are probably as low as at any time since World War I (Daly and Kuwa-
hara 1998).
Concurrent with these changes in trade costs and tariﬀs have been
changes in ratio of foreign trade to world GDP, reported in table 7.2. In the
early nineteenth century trade costs are so high and trade volumes so low
(around 1 percent of GDP) that, of necessity, most production is located
close to local markets. This constraint becomes relaxed through the nine-
teenth century, permitting the agglomeration of manufacturing to occur.
After the reverses of the interwar period, the growth of trade relative to in-
come resumes, again allowing new economic geographies to develop.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century distance is still
a powerful barrier to economic interaction. Gravity modelling ﬁnds that,
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Fig. 7.5 Unweighted world average own tariﬀ, thirty-ﬁve countries (percent)
Source: Clemens and Williamson (2001).









Source: Maddison (2001).controlling for the economic mass of the countries concerned, trade be-
tween them falls oﬀ steeply with distance. The elasticity of trade ﬂows with
respect to distance is typically estimated to be between –0.9 and –1.5, and
the implications of this for trade volumes are given in the ﬁrst column of
table 7.3, which expresses trade volumes at diﬀerent distances relative to
their value at 1,000 km. With an elasticity of –1.25, trade volumes at 4,000
km are down by 82 percent, and by 8,000 km they are down by 93 percent.
Similar methodologies have been used to study other sorts of economic in-
teractions, and some results are summarized in remaining columns of table
7.3. Portes and Rey (1999) study cross-border equity transactions (using
data for fourteen countries accounting for around 87 percent of global eq-
uity market capitalization, 1989–96), and their baseline speciﬁcation gives
an elasticity of transactions with respect to distance of –0.85, so that ﬂows
at 8,000 km are less than one-ﬁfth those at 1,000 km. Foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) ﬂows are studied by Di Mauro (2000), who ﬁnds an elasticity
with respect to distance of –0.42. The eﬀect of distance on technology ﬂows
has been studied by Keller (2000) who looks at the dependence of total fac-
tor productivity on research and development (R&D) stocks for twelve in-
dustries in the Group of Seven (G7) countries, 1971–95. The R&D stocks
include both the own-country stock and foreign country stocks weighted by
distance.3 Both own- and foreign-country stocks are signiﬁcant determi-
nants of each country’s productivity, and so too is the distance eﬀect, with
R&D stocks in distant economies having much weaker eﬀects on produc-
tivity than do R&D stocks in closer economies, so that the eﬀect at 8,000
km is only 5 percent of its eﬀect at 1,000 km.
7.3 Location and Trade Costs: Theory
How have the changing costs of spatial interactions shaped the geo-
graphy of world economic activity? In this section we show how theory sug-
gests that declining costs can explain the observed phases of concentration
and of dispersion.
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Table 7.3 Economic Interactions and Distance (ﬂows relative their magnitude at
1,000 km)
Trade Equity Flows FDI Technology
1,000 km 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2,000 km 0.42 0.55 0.75 0.65
4,000 km 0.18 0.31 0.56 0.28
8,000 km 0.07 0.17 0.42 0.05
Sources: See text.
3. Distance weighting according to exp(–  distanceij).7.3.1 The Location of Activity
Two sorts of considerations determine the structure of production and
level of income of a country or region. One is its internal capacity, its en-
dowment of stocks of factors of production, skills, knowledge, and social
infrastructure. The other is its relationship with other countries or re-
gions—its geography, meaning the access that it has to world markets and
to external supplies of goods, factors, and knowledge.
Traditional trade theory’s analysis of location focuses heavily on the en-
dowments of primary factors of production. Special cases of the approach
are the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model (with equal numbers of goods and
factors) and the speciﬁc factors or Ricardo-Viner model, with more factors
than goods. Both models show how, given world prices, the production
structure and income of each country are determined, with countries tend-
ing to export goods intensive in their abundant factors. What are the pre-
dictions of these models about the eﬀects of globalization? The ﬁrst is that
goods trade liberalization allows countries to exploit their comparative ad-
vantage more fully that we expect to see land-abundant countries becoming
increasingly specialized in agricultural products, and so on. The second
prediction derives from the fact that factor mobility and goods trade are, in
general, substitutes. This means that goods trade liberalization reduces fac-
tor price diﬀerences between countries and thereby reduces the incentives
for migration and capital movements.4 Conversely, factor mobility will in
general reduce trade ﬂows, as factors ﬂow to countries where they are rela-
tively scarce, and thereby reduce the cross-country endowment diﬀerences
that are the basis of trade.
The traditional approach is based on constant returns to scale in pro-
duction, whereas new trade theory and new economic geography are based
on increasing returns within the ﬁrm, and possibly in the economy more
widely. The analysis focuses on the location decisions of ﬁrms and workers.
Drawing on developments made in trade theory in the 1970s and 1980s,
manufacturing production is modeled as distinct increasing returns to scale
ﬁrms operating in imperfectly competitive markets (usually monopolisti-
cally competitive). There is intraindustry trade, as ﬁrms—subject to trans-
port costs and trade barriers—sell their products into each market. What
determines whether a country is proﬁtable place for a ﬁrm to locate? As in
traditional theory, factor prices and factor supplies matter. So too does geo-
graphy, because ﬁrms seek to locate close to large markets and to good
sources of intermediate input supply. The fact that locations with good mar-
ket access are particularly attractive means that these locations will typi-
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4. See Markusen (1983) and Venables (1999) for discussion of the issue of whether trade lib-
eralization and factor mobility are substitutes or complements.cally have a disproportionately large share of manufacturing ﬁrms and can
support substantially higher wages than remote regions.5
Two implications follow from this. The ﬁrst is that size matters: A loca-
tion with a large market will tend to draw in manufacturing activity, possi-
bly bidding up the wage in the location. The second implication follows
from combining this with labor mobility. If labor is mobile between loca-
tions, then the higher wage will attract labor inﬂow, enlarging the market
still further. This interaction between ﬁrms wanting to locate in large mar-
kets and demand from their workers enlarging the market provides the ba-
sis for a process of cumulative causation leading to spatial concentration of
activity. Krugman (1991b) shows how, if transport costs are low enough,
mobile factors will agglomerate in just one location.
Although labor mobility can provide a basis for agglomeration of activ-
ity, it is not a necessary condition for it to occur. Much of the demand for
ﬁrms’ output comes not from ﬁnal consumers but from other ﬁrms that pur-
chase intermediate goods and services. Thus, as downstream ﬁrms move to
a location they enlarge the market for upstream ﬁrms, and as upstream
ﬁrms move they increase the supply and lower the price of intermediate
goods. This interaction can create cumulative causation and clustering of
linked industrial activities in a location (Venables 1996). The process is no
more than the interaction of forward and backward linkages that received
so much attention in the development literature of the 1960s, and whose ori-
gins date back (at least) to Marshall (1920), in whose words
Subsidiary trades grow up in the neighbourhood, supplying it with im-
plements and materials, organising its traﬃc, and in many ways conduc-
ing to the economy of its material . . . [T]he economic use of expensive
machinery can sometimes be attained in a very high degree in a district in
which there is large aggregate production of the same kind....  [S]ub-
sidiary industries devoting themselves each to one small branch of the
process of production, and working it for a great many of their neigh-
bours, are able to keep in constant use machinery of the most highly spe-
cialised character, and to make it pay its expenses.
The contributions of the new literature are to identify circumstances un-
der which these linkages will lead to clustering of activity and the extent to
which they support wage diﬀerences between locations. As we will see, out-
comes depend critically on the level of trade costs, so clustering occurs at
some levels of trade costs, and dispersion at other levels.
Other forces too can give rise to spatial clustering of activity, and we note
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5. The implications of good market potential for production are sometimes called the “home
market eﬀect.” Davis and Weinstein (1997) ﬁnd considerable empirical support for it. Wage im-
plications of market access are studied in Redding and Venables (2000). The advantages of
coastal regions and other geographical factors in developing countries are documented in
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999).just two further mechanisms, drawing on Marshall’s treatment. His second
clustering force is a thick labor market:
A localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it oﬀers a
constant market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where
they are likely to ﬁnd a good choice of workers with the special skill which
they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where
there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where there-
fore it is likely to ﬁnd a good market. The owner of an isolated factory,
even if he has good access to a plentiful supply of general labour, is often
put to great shifts for want of some special skilled labour; and a skilled
workman, when thrown out of employment in it, has no easy refuge.
This—while undoubtedly important—has received much less attention in
the modern literature, although see Krugman (1991a) for a rudimentary
model.
The third mechanism is geographically concentrated technological ex-
ternalities:
The mysteries of the trade become no mystery; but are as it were in the
air....  G o o d  w o r k  i s  rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements
in machinery, in processes and the general organisation of the business
have their merits promptly discussed; if one man starts a new idea, it is
taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus
it becomes the source of further new ideas.
This idea is applied in much of the regional and urban literature (see, e.g.,
Henderson 1974), as well as in some older trade literature (Ethier 1979). It
is perhaps best viewed as a black box for a variety of diﬃcult-to-model yet
important proximity beneﬁts.
7.3.2 History of the World?
Once these clustering forces are put in a full general equilibrium model of
trade and location, what happens, and what predictions are derived for the
eﬀects of globalization? A sweeping view of world history is provided by the
model by Krugman and Venables (1995) that studies the eﬀects of falling
trade costs on industrial location and income levels. Their model has just
two countries (N and S), endowed with the same quantities of internation-
ally immobile labor. There are two production sectors: perfectly competi-
tive agriculture, and manufacturing. Manufacturing has increasing returns
(modeled as monopolistic competition) and forward and backward link-
ages (modeled as ﬁrms using manufactured products as well as labor to pro-
duce output for use by other ﬁrms as well as for ﬁnal consumption).
The Krugman and Venables story is summarized in ﬁgure 7.6, which has
trade costs on the horizontal axis and real wages in N and S on the vertical
axis. At very high trade costs the two economies have the same wage rates
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ages between manufacturing ﬁrms create a force for agglomeration, but
when trade costs are high these are dominated by the need for ﬁrms to op-
erate in each country to supply local consumers. As trade costs fall (moving
left on the ﬁgure), so the possibility of supplying consumption through
trade rather than local production develops, and clustering forces become
relatively more important. At point A clustering forces come to dominate,
and the equilibrium with equal amounts of manufacturing in each country
becomes unstable; if one ﬁrm relocates from S to N then it raises the prof-
itability of ﬁrms in N and reducesthe proﬁtability of ﬁrms in S, causing fur-
ther ﬁrms to follow. Four forces are at work. By moving to N the ﬁrm raises
wages in N and increases supply to N consumers, both eﬀects tending to re-
duce proﬁtability in N. But against this it increases the size of the N market
(the backward linkage, creating a demand for intermediates) and reduces
the costs of intermediates in N (the forward linkage, oﬀering a supply of in-
termediates). The last two eﬀects come to dominate, and we see agglomer-
ation of industry in one country, which raises wages in the country with in-
dustry, as illustrated.6
For a range of trade costs below A, the world necessarily has a dichoto-
mous structure. Wages are lower in S, but it does not proﬁt any ﬁrm to move
to S because to do so would be to forgo the clustering beneﬁts of large mar-
kets and the proximity to suppliers that are found in N. However, as trade
costs fall it becomes cheaper to ship intermediate goods; linkages matter
less, so the location of manufacturing becomes more sensitive to factor
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Fig. 7.6 History of the world
6. There is a range in which agglomeration (with w N   w S) and dispersion (with w N   w S) are
both stable equilibriums. See Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) for details.price diﬀerences. Manufacturing therefore starts to move to S and the equi-
librium wage gap narrows. In this model, wage gap goes all the way to fac-
tor price equalization when trade is perfectly free—the “death of distance.”
The relationship between the model and our earlier discussion of the
changing spatial patterns of industrial location is apparent. Falling trade
costs combined with industrial linkages oﬀer an explanation of both the
concentration of manufacturing activity and its dispersion. As trade costs
go from very high to somewhat lower levels there is deindustrialization of
some regions and widening income gaps—the ﬁrst phase of concentration
of activity. At lower levels of trade costs, industry starts to spread out of es-
tablished centers to some lower-cost regions.
Of course, the model is stylized, and many extensions are needed if it is to
be convincingly linked to the historical record. We discuss some of these ex-
tensions in detail in following sections, and outline them here. Most obvi-
ously, ﬁgure 7.6 assumes international immobility of labor. Labor migra-
tion can be an additional force for agglomeration—at the city and regional
level, as well as internationally—and was clearly important historically, no-
tably in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We return to this in
section 7.4. Also, the story needs to be enriched to include many countries,
many sectors, and other clustering mechanisms. If there are many countries
then the convergence phase is no longer smooth; it involves an increasing
number of locations with industry, rather than steady industrialization of
them all. Other clustering mechanisms may interact with trade costs in
diﬀerent ways from the linkages described above. For example, the strength
of clustering forces arising from labor market skills is likely to be largely un-
aﬀected by trade costs. In sectors where this is important, falling trade costs
will not bring about the death of distance, and clusters are likely to remain
in place. We take up some of these issues in following sections, and formal
analysis of them is undertaken in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999).
7.4 The Nineteenth Century
We have already shown the potential that a geographical approach has
for the explanation of one of the three phases highlighted in ﬁgures 7.1 and
7.2, namely, the decline—absolute as well as relative—of industrial activity
outside the emerging core of northwestern Europe. In this section we want
to pursue two further aspects of the nineteenth-century experience in
greater detail. One is the rise of the New World, and the other is the growth
of urbanization.
7.4.1 The Economic Development of the New World
Following the relative and absolute decline of the Asian economies, the
other main change in the economic geography of the nineteenth-century
world was the rise of the New World, and within this the particular domi-
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trial producer and a successful manufacturing exporter. Its industrializa-
tion, accomplished behind high tariﬀ walls, was concentrated in the “man-
ufacturing belt” of the northeast, a region with the highest GDP per person
in the world. This had not seemed at all probable in 1860, when America’s
role in the world economy was apparently destined to be that of a large pri-
mary products exporter based on an abundant endowment of natural re-
sources.
This prompts two obvious, related questions. First, why did the United
States rather than Latin America become the area that overtook the United
Kingdom and the rest of Europe in real GDP per person? Second, why did
the United States also become the only non-European country to establish
a position as a net manufactured exporter? In 1913, while Canada, Latin
America, and Oceania had net imports of manufactures to the value of $525
million, $828 million, and $361 million, respectively, the United States had
net exports of $368 million and already represented the third largest share
in world manufactured exports (Yates 1959).
The contrast with the overall experience of Latin America was marked.
The nineteenth century can be seen as a period when Latin America fell se-
riously behind, although by 1913 its most successful economy, Argentina,
had experienced several decades of rapid growth and had an income level
greater than many European countries. Even so, Argentina had failed to
match the United States over the course of the nineteenth century from a
position of near parity of incomes per head in 1800 (Coatsworth 1998).
Latin America as a whole, which accounted for slightly more of world GDP
than the United States in 1820, produced only 4.5 percent in 1913, com-
pared with 19.1 percent for the United States and fell from a level of GDP
per person of 52.9 percent that of the United States in 1820 to 28.5 percent
in 1913.
Recent interpretations of these developments by economic historians
have stressed the diﬀering role of institutions and rent-seeking in North and
South America and the political economy conﬁgurations from which they
emerged. North, Summerhill, and Weingast (2000) pointed to the unfortu-
nate legacy of the ending of Spanish colonialism and an associated failure
to establish secure political foundations for economic growth in Latin
America; they contrasted this outcome with the aftermath of British rule in
the United States, which resulted in a constitution with strong protection of
property rights. They see this as the crucial diﬀerence: “No deus ex machina
translates endowments into political outcomes. If that were so, Argentina
would be as rich as the United States” (2000, 19).
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997) also argued that institutions made all the
diﬀerence to development outcomes between Latin and North America but
placed their emphasis on the role of initial factor endowments in creating
institutional divergence that exhibited path-dependent tendencies. Inter-
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implications for labor inﬂow with small family farms in North America
conducive to good institutions and greater equality of wealth and political
power which underwrote both rapid growth and high immigration.
Similarly, David and Wright (1997) have pointed to several highly favor-
able aspects of American institutions and policies for the exploitation of
abundant resources that led to American primacy in the minerals-based, re-
source-intensive technology that was central to technological progress in
the early twentieth century. These included promoting education and sci-
entiﬁc research in relevant disciplines, subsidizing transportation, and or-
ganizing geological surveys and sustaining minerals property rights but
without claiming government entitlement to royalties. Organized thus,
American endowments promoted a technological trajectory that no Euro-
pean country could emulate.
We have no wish to dispute these claims, but we do suggest that it is im-
portant that they are placed more ﬁrmly in a geographic context. In partic-
ular, we believe that size and increasing returns to scale mattered. Table 7.4
displays some information on the size of the United States compared with
other leading New World economies and the United Kingdom. In addition,
we disaggregate the United States into the northeast and other regions. It is
clear that, by 1870, when international transport costs began to fall rapidly,
the United States was already a very large economy.
Indeed, at that time, the United States had almost matched the United
Kingdom in terms of total GDP, and its population was nearly a third larger.
The population of the United States by then already exceeded that of the
whole Latin American and Caribbean area deﬁned by Maddison (2001), and
its GDP was well over three times larger. Relative to the other individual
economies of the New World the United States was in a completely diﬀerent
league in terms of the size of its economy. This was also true, however, for the
northeast, which taken separately matched the United Kingdom in terms of
GDP per person around 1880 and for population by about 1900. This region
already had 29.5 percent of the labor force in manufacturing in 1870, rising
to 38.7 percent by 1910 (Perloﬀ et al. 1960), far ahead of any New World
country and approaching British levels of industrialization.
The growth of the New World economies was boosted by massive factor
ﬂows from the Old World. Declining costs of transport, together with rising
incomes in a world relatively free of immigration restrictions, encouraged
large international migration. Between 1870 and 1910 this augmented the
New World labor force by 40 percent while at the same time reducing the
Old World labor force by 13 percent. The impacts on labor force size in
some individual countries were much larger—for example, an increase of
86 percent in Argentina and a fall of 45 percent in Ireland—while the U.S.
inﬂow amounted to 24 percent and Great Britain’s outﬂow to 11 percent of
the 1910 labor force (Taylor and Williamson 1997). The ratio of foreign as-
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United States 40,241 97,606
Northeast 21,609 49,193
Rest of country 18,632 48,413
United Kingdom 31,393 45,649




United States 98,374 517,383
Northeast 65,615 320,004
Rest of country 32,759 197,379
United Kingdom 100,179 224,618




United States 2,445 5,301
Northeast 3,036 6,505
Rest of country 1,758 4,077





United States 165 160
United Kingdom 100 100
Source: Maddison (2001); U.S. regional ﬁgures approximated using the data in Perloﬀ et al.
(1960) and their deﬁnition of the northeast, which comprises the New England, Middle At-
lantic, and Great Lakes regions. Real wage comparisons from Williamson (1995, 1998).
sets to world GDP grew from 7 percent in 1870 to 18 percent in 1914, about
the same level as in 1980 (Obstfeld and Taylor, chapter 3 in this volume).
The United Kingdom was the principal capital exporter, and outﬂows av-
eraged almost 5 percent of GDP; 34 percent of all British foreign invest-
ment went to North America, compared with 17 percent to Latin America
(Simon 1968). Further discussion of Old World–New World factor ﬂows
from a neoclassical perspective can be found in Lindert and Williamson,
chapter 5 in this volume.
7.4.2 Modeling Migration and Development
If we take the drivers of change to be falling transport costs of goods and
factor mobility (in particular labor migrations, facilitated by falling costs ofmoving people), the challenge for a model is to explain the following styl-
ized facts: the continuing wage advantage of North America relative to the
United Kingdom and to other New World economies, despite migration
ﬂows; the rise of manufacturing in the United States, overturning its appar-
ent comparative advantage in agricultural products; and the failure of man-
ufacturing to develop in other New World economies.
The overtaking of Great Britain by the United States used to be explained
in terms of various kinds of market failure in the former. Brieﬂy, these ar-
guments claimed that ineﬃciencies in the capital market encouraged exces-
sive foreign and inadequate domestic investment, while conservative British
ﬁrms were slow to adopt new techniques and to diversify into new indus-
tries. These claims have, however, failed to stand up to the scrutiny of eco-
nomic historians using neoclassical economics because it is now recognized
that foreign investment was justiﬁed in terms of its returns, diversiﬁcation
into new lines of activity was not impeded by the capital market, and
choices of technique were rational given British factor costs (Crafts 2002a).
Given the successful use of neoclassical economics to debunk crude
claims of British failure it is perhaps not surprising to ﬁnd that existing
studies modeling the development of North-Atlantic economy have been
built largely on a comparative advantage trade model. Applications of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model are said to have performed well (Hutchinson 2000;
Wright 1990). In this tradition, O’Rourke and Williamson (1994) concluded
that a calibrated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of this type
allowed a good explanation of trends toward Anglo-American factor price
convergence, driven by commodity market integration in the face of falling
transport costs and by labor migration. General equilibrium modeling in
this tradition by O’Rourke and Williamson (as summarized by O’Rourke
1996) found that over the period 1870–1910 and initial wage gap of 71.2 per-
cent between the United States and the United Kingdom would have been
reduced by 34.8 percentage points by migration but raised by 13.7 percent-
age points by capital ﬂows. The net impact of factor ﬂows would therefore
have reduced the gap by 24 percentage points, to which commodity market
integration would have added a further 28.5 percentage points. Interest-
ingly, however, instead of narrowing sharply (by 52.5 percentage points) the
U.S.-U.K. wage gap decreased by just 5 percentage points (table 7.4).7
This last points to American access to sources of productivity improve-
ment not available to the United Kingdom and consequently reveals a seri-
ous problem with the neoclassical exoneration of the late Victorian British
economy, namely, that it does not have an adequate explanation for Amer-
ican overtaking. Indeed, it might be argued that this is a general diﬃculty
with neoclassical growth economics; in principle, it can readily embrace
catching-up and convergence but not changing leadership in a Solovian
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7. Or possibly actually widened, depending on data sources used.world of constant returns to scale and common technology. There are two
ways to address this issue in the context of the North-Atlantic economy.
The ﬁrst is to drop the assumption of common technology and argue that
the United States developed its own technology (based on cheap raw mate-
rials and mass markets) that was not transferable to Europe at this time
(Abramovitz and David 1996). This has historical plausibility but may not
be the whole story, however. The second, relatively neglected, is to focus on
the role that geography played through scale economies and agglomeration
beneﬁts. While accepting that localized technical change also mattered, we
explore this by undertaking some rather simple formal modeling to draw
out the diﬀerences between a comparative advantage approach and a new
economic geography approach, and to argue that the latter does much bet-
ter at explaining both the factor-price and the quantity side.
Before developing the models, it is worth recording other voices that have
suggested that the traditional neoclassical framework does not encompass
an important part of the picture in that economies of scale in manufactur-
ing are ignored. Although this may be entirely reasonable for the pre–Civil
War American economy, it is much less appropriate for the later nineteenth
century. Both the traditional business history literature (Chandler 1977)
and the cliometricians (Cain and Paterson 1986; James 1983) agree that
economies of scale in manufacturing between 1870 and 1913 were substan-
tial and pervasive. These were associated with labor-saving and materials-
using biases in technological change and were exploited in the context of a
large and rapidly expanding domestic market. Moreover, a closer look at
trade ﬂows also reveals some limitations of analyses of the Heckscher-Ohlin
type. There was already a considerable amount of intraindustry trade prior
to World War I, and this was associated with scale economies in labor and
materials use (Hutchinson 2000).
Turning to the modeling, let us start with a stylized model of how people
and activity relocate between world regions. We suppose that there are three
regions, each having the same endowment of land and the same spatial re-
lationship to each other (they are located at vertices of an equilateral trian-
gle). The model is intended to be suggestive of the location of activity be-
tween Europe, the United States, and the rest of the New World, but we
impose symmetry in order to get to the heart of the economic forces at
work. We assume that there are two production sectors, agriculture and
manufacturing. The output of both these sectors is tradable, although both
are subject to transport costs. Production in agriculture uses labor and land,
and manufacturing uses labor and manufactures (as an intermediate good).
Sales of agriculture all go to ﬁnal consumption, but sales of manufacturing
go both to ﬁnal consumption and to meet the derived demand for manu-
factures from manufacturing industry. The structure of the model is similar
to Krugman and Venables (1995) and is set out formally in the appendix.
The experiment that we undertake is to start with an initial position in
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eﬀects of moving labor out of this region. As it moves we shall assume that
it goes to regions 2 and 3 in a way that equalizes real wages in 2 and 3. The
idea we seek to capture is that there is out-migration from 1 that is costly,
but (in the spirit of our symmetry assumption) the same migration costs are
incurred in going to either of the other regions. In the exposition that fol-
lows we will talk as if out-migration from region 1 is exogenous. However,
we keep track of the real wage gap between region 1 and other regions, so
inverting the relationship between the distribution of population and the
wage gap shows how a given wage gap (equal to the migration cost) is con-
sistent with a level of population movement.8
Globalization and Geography: The Competitive Model
We start with a perfectly competitive variant of the model, in which pro-
duction in all sectors takes place under constant returns and comparative
advantage is determined entirely by factor endowments. The proportion of
the world labor force in regions 2 and 3 combined is measured on the hori-
zontal axis of ﬁgure 7.7, so that migration is measured by a movement to the
right along the ﬁgure. On the vertical axis we measure the real wages in re-
gions 2 and 3 relative to region 1 (w 2/w1   w 3/w1). The light line is for a case
when goods trade costs are high (both agriculture and manufacture face an
iceberg transport cost factor of 1.7), and the heavy line corresponds to a
lower transport cost factor of 1.25.
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8. Migration plays a central role in our story. Further analysis of the economic impact of mi-
gration in this period can be found in Chiswick and Hatton, chapter 2 in this volume.
Fig. 7.7 Relative wages in competitive modelThe information contained in the ﬁgure is in line with expectations. We
see that as long as region 1 is labor abundant (regions 2 and 3 combined
have less than two-thirds of the world labor force although each region has
one-third of the land), then the wage in regions 2 and 3 exceeds the wage in
region 1. Migration narrows the wage gap, as does a reduction in the cost of
shipping goods (as in O’Rourke and Williamson 1994). At a given level of
migration costs, indicated by the horizontal line ww, migration ﬂows are
smaller the lower are trade costs, indicating that factor mobility and goods
trade are substitutes.
Figure 7.7 is the benchmark case, demonstrating how either factor ﬂows
or goods trade liberalization causes factor price convergence. However, in
this competitive variant neither region 1 nor region 2 can become a net ex-
porter of manufactures. These regions expand their share of manufacturing
only by attracting labor inﬂow and attract labor inﬂow only by being land
abundant, and hence net importers of manufactures. This means that there
is no mechanism in this model by which an economy that initially has a
comparative advantage in agriculture can overturn this and become a net
exporter of manufacturing. Furthermore, regions 2 and 3 are, in this model,
bound to follow identical development paths. Given symmetry in technol-
ogy, preferences, and endowments, the two regions must have the same out-
comes.
Globalization and Geography: The Monopolistic Competition Model
The second variant of the model makes manufacturing monopolistically
competitive, containing ﬁrms that operate under increasing returns and are
subject to forward and backward linkages.9The model now predicts a quite
diﬀerent development path, for two main reasons. The ﬁrst is that market
size (as well as factor prices) becomes an important determinant of where
manufacturing locates; as we have already seen, if two locations diﬀer only
in market size then disproportionately many ﬁrms will locate in the larger
market. The second reason for the diﬀerent development path is the
propensity of manufacturing to agglomerate, arising because of forward
and backward linkages and reinforced by the mobility of labor.10
Panels A and B of ﬁgure 7.8 give the case when trade costs are relatively
high. Like ﬁgure 7.7, the horizontal axis measures the combined population
of regions 2 and 3. On the vertical axis, panel A of ﬁgure 7.8 has relative real
wages and panel B has the share of world manufacturing activity in region
2 and in region 3. We see that when the combined population of regions 2
and 3 is small all manufacturing is agglomerated in region 1. The wage in re-
gions 2 and 3 is quite high because of high land-labor ratios, and adding
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9. As outlined in the appendix. This is the same structure as in section 7.3.2, except that there
are three regions, labor migration is studied, and agriculture, as well as industry, has transport
costs and product diﬀerentiation.
10. This input-output structure was also present in the perfectly competitive variant of ﬁg-
ure 7.6, but the linkages are important only when combined with increasing returns.more labor reduces the wage gap (like in ﬁg. 7.7). However, as the labor
force of regions 2 and 3 increases, the combination of lower wages and
larger market size makes it proﬁtable for manufacturing activity to start in
these regions (at point A). Industrialization in both simultaneously is, how-
ever, unstable, because if one region got just slightly ahead then agglomer-
ation beneﬁts would make it more proﬁtable, attracting more manufactur-
ing and more labor inﬂow. If the regions are identical it is a matter of chance
which one industrializes, and we suppose that it is region 2, as indicated in
panel B. The eﬀect of this is to increase wages, as labor in region 2 is drawn
oﬀ the land and into manufacturing.
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Fig. 7.8 High trade cost: A, Relative wages; B, Manufacturing sharesFurther labor outﬂow from region 1 will go predominantly to region 2,
but after some point the additional labor in these regions starts to reduce
wages again, as well as further enlarging market size. Region 3 then indus-
trializes (at point B), catching up with region 2, and resulting in another in-
crease in relative wages. The relative wage path illustrated in panel A of ﬁg-
ure 7.8 can then be understood in terms of labor inﬂow tending to depress
wages as land-labor ratios fall, punctuated by industrialization episodes rais-
ing labor demand and wages. We can also use panel A of ﬁgure 7.8 to ana-
lyze the endogenous migration story. If migration were perfectly free to re-
spond to any wage diﬀerential, however small, then labor ﬂows would move
the world economy to point S, at which all three regions are identical with
the same economic structures and factor price equalization. Alternatively, if
we contrive migration costs to be just suﬃcient to support a wage gap illus-
trated by the line ww, then there are three stable migrational equilibriums (as
well as two unstable), as marked by the solid circles. Thus, the equilibriums
of industry in just region 1, in regions 1 and 2, or in regions 1, 2, and 3 are all
stable equilibriums. However, at this level of migration costs, simple dynam-
ics starting with population concentrated in region 1 would leave the world
in the ﬁrst of these equilibriums, with regions 2 and 3 remaining agricultural.
Panels A and B of ﬁgure 7.9 are analogous, but computed for a lower
value of trade costs. There are three main diﬀerences. First, manufacturing
commences in region 2 only when more population has moved to regions 2
and 3; this is because a larger market size is required to oﬀset the eﬀects of
more intense import competition from region 1. Second, manufacturing
never takes oﬀin region 3—again, because of the more intense import com-
petition it faces; essentially, at this level of transport costs world demand for
manufactures can be met from just one or two clusters. Region 2 therefore
develops a diﬀerent economic structure from region 3, with a larger popu-
lation and higher share of world income. Third, region 2 becomes a net ex-
porter of manufactures, and this occurs at the point at which its share of
world production of manufactures exceeds its share of world income (see
panel B).
Lower trade costs have the eﬀect of decreasing wages in labor-abundant
economies (as in the competitive case, ﬁg. 7.7), and the wage path is illus-
trated by the heavy line aa on ﬁgure 7.9, panel A. There is a kink in this
curve at the point at which industrialization in region 2 commences, but in
the case illustrated this kink occurs when real wages are lower in regions 2
and 3 than in region 1, suggesting that migration would not bring about
suﬃcient labor movement to reach the point at which manufacturing de-
velops. Thus, product market integration has the eﬀect of locking the man-
ufacturing agglomeration into an established center and also, because of
the labor demand this creates, of reducing the incentive for out-migration
from this center.
The higher wage curves in panel A ﬁgure 7.9 oﬀer some responses to this
dilemma. The ﬁrst of these, bb, is computed allowing transport costs to fall
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wages in regions 2 and 3 relative to region 1, thus increasing migration ﬂows
and creating a migration path that supports industrialization by region 2 al-
though not by region 3. Thus, the model is able to explain both the asym-
metric development of ex ante identical countries and the way in which an
economy with initial comparative advantage in agriculture can industrial-
ize and become a net exporter of manufactures.
The next curve, cc, introduces (additionally) an asymmetry between re-
gions, letting region 2 have 20 percent greater land endowment than regions
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Fig. 7.9 Low trade cost: A, Relative wages; B, Manufacturing and income shares1 and 3. This raises wages and increases the population and market size of
region 2, thereby bringing forward the industrialization of region 2, as indi-
cated by the position of the kink in this wage schedule. The ﬁnal curve, dd,
illustrates the eﬀect of a region 2 import tariﬀ on manufactures of 10 per-
cent (on top of the diﬀerent land endowment). When region 2 has no in-
dustry this reduces real wages, for the usual reasons of welfare loss associ-
ated with tariﬀs. However, the tariﬀbrings forward industrialization, which
in turn raises wages and accelerates the growth of population of the region.
Although these are very stylized exercises, we think that viewing the de-
velopment of the New World through this lens can oﬀer important insights.
As we have seen, it oﬀers an explanation of how one region can industrial-
ize while another does not; of how this region can have its relative wages in-
crease despite population inﬂow; and of how it can become a net exporter
of manufactures despite its initial comparative advantage. The importance
of scale eﬀects suggests that open-access migration policies may have mat-
tered much more than is generally acknowledged, and it indicates a poten-
tially more powerful and diﬀerent role for tariﬀ policies than traditional
analyses would allow (Irwin 2000). Given the interrelationship between mi-
gration and trade costs, the model also highlights the importance of the
timing of the transport improvements that came when migration into the
American economy was already substantial and when manufacturing pro-
duction functions were being transformed. None of this should be taken to
negate the insights of those economic historians who have rightly pointed
to the role of institutions in growth outcomes, but it might suggest that un-
due emphasis on property rights is to be avoided.
Finally, in related research, Crafts and Venables (2001) have simulated
the development of the North Atlantic economy using a computable gen-
eral equilibrium model, calibrated to 1870 and 1913 data. This gives results
that are consistent with the approach set out here. The competitive variant
of the model cannot replicate the large growth of American manufacturing
and predicts a large decline in the U.S.-U.K. real wage gap, whereas incor-
porating increasing returns and linkages in the manufacturing sector
largely rectiﬁes these deﬁciencies. Comparison of results with and without
the high American tariﬀs of the period shows that these had a substantial
positive eﬀect on industrialization based on the positive feedbacks associ-
ated with the migration that it induced. In nineteenth-century conditions,
these results suggest that the United States, starting with an “empty coun-
try,” gained from employing the opposite of the current OECD policy norm
of blocking migration from poorer countries and freeing up trade.
7.4.3 Urbanization
The implications of declining trade costs are felt at the subnational level
as well as internationally, and, just as they facilitated concentration of world
manufacturing, so they also promoted the development of urban agglom-
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geography that occurred during the decades before World War I, and its im-
pact on the location of the labor force far outweighed that of international
migration. Whereas about 34 million people emigrated from European
countries between 1851 and 1910 (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929), the increase
in urban population in Europe and North America totalled 145 million in
the same period. Moreover, the number of large cities grew disproportion-
ately: Whereas in 1800 there were 24 cities in the developed world with a
population over 100,000, by 1914 this had risen to 281 (Bairoch 1988). Table
7.5 reports the rapid increase in urbanization rates in these countries that
contrast with an unchanged urban proportion in the third world.
The hypothesis underlying the growth of urban centers is simple: The di-
vision of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and improved trans-
port technologies overcome this, enabling production to take place on a
larger scale (and with more division of labor) and enabling cities to form
and reap the agglomeration beneﬁts outlined above.
Until recently, there has been surprisingly little formal economic analysis
of this hypothesis. The central-place theory of Losch (1954) puts forward
the trade-oﬀbetween returns to scale and transport costs, but its focus is on
the optimal lattice of market areas, rather than the equilibrium size and
structure of cities. Henderson (1974) broke with these traditions and mod-
eled city size on the basis of technological externalities within industries.
But at the same time, he took a strangely aspatial approach, saying nothing
about where cities are located, the spatial nature of economic interactions,
or the role of transport and communications technologies in enabling city
formation. Fujita (1989) developed both an explicit geography and micro-
foundations for returns to scale.11 The trade-oﬀ between transport costs
348 Nicholas Crafts and Anthony J. Venables
Table 7.5 Urbanization Levels (% population, criterion of 5,000 for urban
population)
1800 1850 1910 1980
England 23 45 75 79
France 12 193 86 9
Germany 9 15 49 75
Europe 12 194 16 6
United States 5 14 42 65
Australia — 8 42 80
Latin America 14 18 22 63
Third world 9 9 10 32
Source: Bairoch (1988, tables 13.4, 29.1).
Note: Dash indicates data are not available.
11. Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) extend this approach. See also Puga (1998) for the
interaction of scale economies and transport costs.and increasing returns means that the real wage that can be paid in a city is
a function of its size, and there is in general a unique city size that gives the
maximum wage. This wage-maximizing city size depends on transport
costs; as transport costs fall, cities will become larger.
In Great Britain, this process became really apparent during the canal
era of the late eighteenth century and is epitomized by the growth of Birm-
ingham (Turnbull 1987). Detailed simulation of British experience during
the Industrial Revolution reveals that cities were underpinned by an elastic
supply of agricultural imports from the rest of the world contingent on the
development of an improved commercial and transport infrastructure
(Harley and Crafts 2000; Crafts and Harley 2002). For nineteenth-century
Europe, regression analysis shows that the major inﬂuences on the pace of
urbanization across countries were the growth of industrialization, interna-
tional trade, and agricultural productivity (Bairoch and Goertz 1986).
Lowered transport costs and, in particular, new rail facilities facilitated the
growth of large cities in nineteenth-century America and gave rise to ag-
glomeration beneﬁts as the costs of moving goods fell. The division of labor
was enhanced by increased market size (Ades and Glaeser 1999). Small-
scale producers in regions like the midwest were disadvantaged, and manu-
facturing activities became increasingly spatially concentrated. By 1890,
over 25 percent of value added in American manufacturing originated in
New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago (Pred 1977).
Although clustering of activities promotes development of cities, there
has been debate about the extent to which clustering forces are industry spe-
ciﬁc or broader. If they are industry speciﬁc, then the process of city growth
will be accompanied by specialization. High degrees of specialization were
indeed an important feature of nineteenth-century cities. In 46 of the largest
100 American cities in 1880, one or two industries accounted for more than
50 percent of manufacturing employment (Kim 2000). In the second half of
the nineteenth century large cities were increasingly industrial, and spatial
concentration of manufacturing in already large cities was a prominent fea-
ture of the industrialization experience.
David’s (1989) study of Chicago conﬁrmed that its phenomenal growth
was founded on agglomeration eﬀects rather than internal economies of
scale. Chicago’s success, however, stemmed from a diversiﬁed industrial
base that suggests that interindustry knowledge spillovers may also have
been important, as hypothesized by Jacobs (1969). This is also a strong
theme in the account of late nineteenth-century European urbanization by
Hohenberg and Lees (1985), who stressed an explosion of knowledge-
centered economic growth, and it appears to be borne out by the econo-
metric investigation of English city growth performed by Simon and Nar-
dinelli (1996).
In fact, it appears likely that both industry-speciﬁc (Henderson-type)
and Jacobs-type external economies of scale were operative in Victorian
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reached by Broadberry and Marrison (2002) in an analysis of the British
cotton textiles industry on the eve of World War I. They found that both
types of external-scale economies were critical to the industry’s ability to
withstand foreign competition from relatively low-wage producers.
Thus, although we usually think of globalization as occurring at the in-
ternational level, its driving forces are also important at the subnational
level. They promoted the urbanization of the nineteenth-century world,
thereby facilitating the division of labor and exploitation of returns to scale
associated with industrialization. In addition, it is clear that the experience
of nineteenth-century urbanization bears out the value of the new eco-
nomic geography approach to explaining the location of production.
7.5 The Late Twentieth Century
The interwar period is well known to have been a period of globalization
backlash in which there was disintegration of the world economy. This was
an epoch of trade wars and international capital controls, and also a time
when transport costs ceased to fall. The reconstruction of the world econ-
omy after World War II involved a successful liberalization of international
trade in manufactures under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT) and a resurgence in international capital mobility, notably from
the breakdown in the Bretton Woods ﬁxed exchange rate system in the early
1970s. As table 7.2 reported, the ratio of world merchandise exports to
world GDP, which had fallen to 5.5 percent in 1950, rose to 10.5 percent by
1973 and to 17.2 percent in 1998. Foreign assets as a proportion of world
GDP, which had fallen to 5 percent in 1945, regained the 1914 level of 18
percent in 1980 and by 1995 had surged to 57 percent (Obstfeld and Taylor,
chapter 3 in this volume).
Falling transport and communications costs continued to be a driver of
globalization, as table 7.1 suggests. A decline in shipping costs was aug-
mented by several other important developments. One was the develop-
ment of new information and communications technologies (ICT), the im-
plications of which we discuss in section 7.5.3. Another was the reduction
in transit times associated with the development of air travel (and air-
freight) and the development of containerization, bringing both faster port
handling and faster ocean shipping. The importance of time in transit has
been estimated in recent work by Hummels (2000), who ﬁnds that the cost
of an extra day’s travel is (for imports as a whole) around 0.3 percent of the
value shipped. For manufacturing sectors, the number goes up to 0.5 per-
cent, costs that are around 30 times larger than the interest charge on the
value of the goods. One implication of these ﬁgures is that transport costs
have fallen much more through time than is suggested by looking at freight
charges alone. The share of U.S. imports going by airfreight rose from zero
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doubled the speed of ocean shipping. Together these innovations give a re-
duction in average shipping time of twenty-six days, equivalent to a ship-
ping cost reduction worth 12–13 percent of the value of goods traded.
The growing value of trade only tells part of the story, because there were
also new types of trade developing. The growth of international production
networks is reﬂected in growing volumes of trade in parts and components.
Yeats (1998) estimates that 30 percent of world trade in manufactures is
trade in components rather than ﬁnal products. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi
(2001) chart trade ﬂows that cross borders multiple times, as when a coun-
try imports a component and then re-exports it embodied in some down-
stream product. They ﬁnd that (for ten OECD countries) the share of im-
ported value added in exports rose by one-third between 1970 and 1990,
reaching 21 percent of export value.
Finally, the period saw the growing role of FDI. Although the world FDI
stock showed virtually no growth between 1938 and 1960 (Jones and
Schroter 1983) after that it rose rapidly from 5.4 percent of world GDP in
1980 to 14.1 percent in 1998 (World Bank 2000). The vast majority of this
capital was in Europe and North America—about 68 percent in 1980 and
63 percent in 1999—but East Asia, not including China or Japan, had 10
percent already by 1980, and China’s share had grown to over 6 percent by
1999.
7.5.1 Divergence, Big Time
Traditional neoclassical theories of economic growth predict conver-
gence of incomes based on the catch-up of countries with initially low lev-
els of (broad) capital and output per worker in a world of universally avail-
able technology. The empirical application of these ideas has usually been
phrased in terms of conditional convergence allowing some role for diﬀer-
ences in rates of factor accumulation (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). The
actual experience of the world in the twentieth century has, however, been
described recently as “divergence, big time” (Pritchett 1997) which is not
surprising given the trends reported in table 7.6. Whereas in 1870 income
per head in Africa was about one-eighth that in the leading country, by 1998
the ratio was about one-twentieth (Maddison 2001). In 1998, as table 7.6
shows, many of the world’s population lived in countries where income lev-
els were a lower percentage of the U.S. level than in 1950. Western Europe
and East Asia gained ground relatively, while other countries fell back. This
is the pattern of “twin peaks” highlighted by Quah (1997).
A variant on the neoclassical perspective is provided in Lucas (2000). He
argues that the divergence of the twentieth century will be reversed because
sooner or later every country will join the industrial revolution as best-
practice policies and institutions are imitated in hitherto unsuccessful
countries and thus the Solovian assumption of “universal technology” be-
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of the major economic events of the century to come” (Lucas, 166). He
bases his prediction on a simple model in which new entrants to the growth
process start at (2   2.5n) percent per year, where n is the number of ﬁfty-
year periods to have elapsed since 1800; thus, a country experiencing take-
oﬀin the early twenty-ﬁrst century will grow initially at 12 percent per year,
compared with 7 percent for the 1900 entrant. All countries have an equal
chance of joining the growth club with a hazard rate evolving from .01 to .03
over time. This last assumption is clearly contrary to the predictions of the
geography school as well as the new institutional economic history.
The new institutional economic historian’s perspective provided by
North (1990) sees institutions as the key stumbling block. In this view there
are no Coasian bargains available to ensure that bad institutions are re-
placed; rather, the world is one of path dependency, where network exter-
nalities, vested interests spawned by the existing arrangements, and infor-
mal constraints, embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct that
are impervious to deliberate policy reform, hold sway. The economic geo-
graphy perspective argues that agglomeration beneﬁts dominate the devel-
opment process such that size and distance matter, as set out in section 7.3.
The evidence of growth regressions certainly suggests that institutions
have a strong eﬀect on growth outcomes (Knack and Keefer 1995) and bad
institutions remain unreformed in many countries (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Zoido-Lobaton 1999). But recent experience also shows that institutional
reform in the third world has delivered a good deal less than followers of
growth regressions might have expected (Easterly 2001). This last study
found that, taking into account standard conditioning variables, third
world growth is strongly inﬂuenced by growth in the country’s main OECD
trading partner. It is also typically the case either that regional dummy vari-
ables (East Asia, positive; Africa and Latin America, negative) show up
strongly or that justifying their omission requires the inclusion of explicit
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Table 7.6 Real GDP per Person Gaps with the United States (United States   100)
1950 1998
Western Europe 48.0 65.6
Eastern Europe 22.2 20.0
China 4.6 11.4
Japan 20.1 74.7
Other East Asia 9.6 20.1
British India 6.4 6.1
Latin America 26.7 21.2
Africa 8.9 5.0
Source: Maddison (2001).
Note: In each year the income level is expressed as a percentage of the U.S. level. Regions de-
ﬁned as in ﬁgure 7.1.geographic variables (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999). And when in-
come levels are related to measures of market and supplier access, about 70
percent of the variance can be explained in this way (Redding and Venables
2000).
Thus, the world may not be quite the level playing ﬁeld that the Lucas
model supposes. Both institutional and geographic variables aﬀect catch-
up growth prospects. The chances of joining the fast growth club appear to
be quite uneven. East Asia has succeeded, however. According to conven-
tional wisdom this has been the result of good institutions and policy that
have underpinned high rates of capital accumulation and strong productiv-
ity performance (World Bank 1993). What does a geographic perspective
have to add?
7.5.2 The Spread of Industry
At the heart of East Asian success has been prowess in manufacturing. In
section 7.2 we established the growing spread of industry out of established
centers and pointed out how exceptional East Asian performance had
been, especially in growth of manufactured exports and production.
Conventional treatments suggest that Japan and then the Tigers and
China established institutions and policies that were conducive to strong
investment in both human and physical capital and facilitated tech-
nology transfer. In most cases “developmental states” were involved in
jump-starting the development process and in creating institutions that
lowered transactions costs in imperfect markets, thus implementing a Ger-
schenkronian escape from economic backwardness (Crafts 2002b). In par-
ticular, these economies were committed to an outwardly oriented growth
process in which competition to succeed in world markets held rent-seeking
in check (World Bank 1993).
These arguments are well taken, but they are not the whole story. As the
development process evolved, aspects consistent with what would be ex-
pected from the geographical approach previously outlined play an in-
creasingly important role. If we add many countries to the Krugman-
Venables story of ﬁgure 7.1, the approach predicts that during phase III
convergence will not be uniform but will instead take the form of countries,
in sequence, making a relatively rapid transit from the “poor club” to the
“rich club.” For example, Puga and Venables (1996) modeled a situation of
a large number of identical countries, with manufacturing initially agglom-
erated in just one of them. They considered a steady (exogenous) growth in
demand for manufactures, which had the eﬀect of bidding up the wage in
the country with the agglomeration. At some point the wage gap between
this country and others becomes too large to be sustainable, and industry
starts to move to other countries. However, moving to all other countries is
unstable, as in ﬁgures 7.8 and 7.9; if one country gets just slightly ahead,
then cumulative causation causes this one to take oﬀ and the others to fall
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poor club to the rich club. Continuing demand growth (as well as falling
transport costs) then makes the cycle repeat itself: Industry once again spills
out, and another country makes a rapid transit to the rich club. The model
was intended to be suggestive of the industrialization experience in Asia,
which is illustrated in ﬁgure 7.10. The vertical axis of this ﬁgure is the share
of manufacturing in GDP in selected Asian countries, and the story is very
much as predicted by the theory.
In this perspective, the initial success of Japan adds to the development
prospects of the rest of East Asia much as the so-called “ﬂying geese” model
suggests. As Japanese wage costs rose, particularly from the 1980s, domes-
tic manufacturing investment was discouraged and FDI ﬂowed out to other
parts of the region; “hollowing out” of Japanese industry became a notice-
able feature (Cowling and Tomlinson 2000). In 1991–95 Japanese invest-
ment in Asian manufacturing totalled $22.9 billion, compared with $7.6 bil-
lion in 1951–85 (Legewie 1999). East Asian wage costs typically were low
relative both to other parts of the world and to the labor productivity gap
with the established centers. Thus, even in the mid–1980s labor costs in Ko-
rea and Taiwan were only around 10 percent of the American (20 percent
of the Japanese level; Jacobs 2000) when manufacturing labor productivity
was close to 20 percent of the American level (Timmer 1999) and at a time
when African wages were, in most cases, 15 to 25 percent of those in the
United States.
The costs of regional transactions fell sharply. As one recent survey put
it, both the hardware and software of East Asian linkages improved rapidly;
better communications and networks of overseas Chinese both played an
important part (Petri 1995). As new economic geography models predict,
clustering became apparent (e.g., microcomputers in Taiwan, electronics in
Malaysia), and external economies of scale from agglomeration accrued. In
a detailed study of Korea, Henderson, Lee, and Lee (2001) found that in the
period 1983–93 these were comparable to U.S. experience and that a dou-
bling of an industry’s size in a particular city implied a productivity increase
of about 6 percent. Japanese FDI has tended to cluster, which also under-
lines the importance of agglomeration beneﬁts (Head, Ries, and Swenson
1995).
The manufacturing export performance of the newly industrializing
Asian countries has been impressive. It cannot be explained, however,
within the conﬁnes of the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin model, as Lall (1998)
showed. The pattern of exports with its strong achievement in high-
technology sectors has relied on external economies of scale which accrue
from learning and labor market pooling. Undoubtedly, this has been the
result in part of good policy, in terms of addressing market failures (for ex-
ample) through public-private partnerships although not through inter-
sectoral transfers of resources (Crafts 1999); but it seems clear that intra-























































































.sectoral productivity improvement based on agglomeration beneﬁts has
been central to the achievement (Hobday 1995).
7.5.3 New Technologies: The Death of Distance?
We conclude with some remarks about the implications of new technol-
ogies for the likely future economic geography of the world. Although the
continuing spread of industry—through lower trade costs, easier remote
management, and the development of production networks—seems likely,
what are the prospects for a more radical change, a “death of distance”
whereby technologies will enable suitably qualiﬁed countries to operate “as
though geography has no meaning” (Cairncross 2001)? Evidently, some ac-
tivities can now be fully digitized and located and transmitted around the
world at essentially zero cost. The best examples are the ICT-enabled ser-
vices, such as transcription of medical records or cartoon ﬁlm drawings,
that now (with other software services) make up around 10 percent of In-
dia’s total exports. Although these activities have brought prosperity to
some developing regions, it seems unlikely that more than a few percent of
world GDP is likely to fall in this category. Activities that become digitiz-
able fall rapidly in price and are likely to be fully automated in time (e.g., by
voice recognition software or computer graphics).
Other activities remain tied to markets, or retain a propensity to cluster.
Some technical changes seem to increase the value of proximity—for ex-
ample, the improved stock control and information ﬂows that support just-
in-time technologies, and the consequent clustering of suppliers around as-
sembly plants. The importance of access to pools of skilled or specialist
labor (one of Marshall’s agglomeration forces) is not likely to be signiﬁ-
cantly diminished, nor the mobility of this labor signiﬁcantly increased, by
new technologies. Indeed, the microfoundations of agglomeration
economies for U.S. manufacturing industries now, unlike in the nineteenth
century, seem to rest more than any other single factor on labor market
pooling (Rosenthal and Strange 2001). The role of cities in reducing trans-
port costs for goods is much less important now, whereas the role that cities
play in eliminating the distance between people appears to be growing as
time costs increase (Glaeser 1998).
It is quite probable that the growing use of e-commerce will in some cases
increase the attractiveness of market transactions relative to vertically inte-
grated production; that is, it will change the optimal boundaries of the
ﬁrm—for example, by raising the eﬀective number of suppliers of interme-
diates and reducing the scope for opportunism in the presence of asset
speciﬁcity. Thus, the classic historical example of vertical integration, the
takeover of Fisher Body by General Motors in the 1920s, was reversed in
1999 when the parts division of General Motors became a separate com-
pany, Delphi Automotive Systems (Lucking-Reiley and Spulber 2001).
But in an increasingly information-based economy, much information
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important. Sometimes this is because of the inherent complexity of the in-
formation (as in R&D and coauthorship), and sometimes because of in-
complete contracting, which requires face-to-face contact for monitoring
and for building trust (Leamer and Storper 2001). Indeed, the possibility of
spatially separating these activities from more routine parts of the supply
process will likely enhance their concentration. For example, in ﬁnancial
services, once the backroom operations can be separated from the front
room, then the agglomeration forces on the latter become overwhelming
and the attractions of London, New York, and Tokyo are no longer diluted
by the expense of oﬃce space for clerical activities.
What this suggests, then, is that agglomeration forces—and consequent
inequalities in the location of activity and in income levels—are likely to re-
main important. However, the basis of these forces might change, from the
nineteenth-century model of high transport costs for goods and agglomer-
ation of heavy industries, to the twenty-ﬁrst-century model of agglomera-
tion of information-based activities—in ﬁnance, R&D, and entertain-
ment—in cities with pools of highly specialized labor.
7.6 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to show that placing the economic history
of the past two centuries in a geographical perspective can add to our un-
derstanding of the past experience of economic development and thus to fu-
ture prospects for income convergence following a long phase of diver-
gence. We have argued that agglomeration has mattered a great deal and
will continue to be important. Modeling of the shifting international loca-
tion of industry is enhanced by including scale economies and linkage
eﬀects.
A historical episode in which this approach oﬀers major new insights is
the performance of the United States relative both to Great Britain and to
Latin America. This cannot readily be encompassed in a traditional neo-
classical framework and is not wholly explained by the quality of American
institutions. Our analysis highlights the roles played by migration and tariﬀ
policies in promoting the industrialization of the United States.
For today’s world, recognizing the importance of agglomeration in eco-
nomic development implies that size and location will continue strongly to
inﬂuence future relative income levels. Predictions of the death of distance
in the new economy based on ICT are premature. However, there are sev-
eral distinct sources of agglomeration beneﬁts, and in the twenty-ﬁrst cen-
tury these are likely to revolve much more around complexities of informa-
tion and pools of skilled labor than the costs of transporting manufactured
goods.
With regard to the issues of catch-up and convergence in economic
Globalization in History: A Geographical Perspective 357growth, we have stressed that both the neoclassical growth and the new in-
stitutional economic history schools are missing an important dimension.
We do not share the optimism of Lucas (2000) that the present century will
be one in which international income inequality is eliminated, and we be-
lieve that current fashions in economic history are in danger of exaggerat-
ing the role played by institutional quality in development outcomes. A ge-
ographical perspective suggests that in economic development the playing
ﬁeld is far from level and that recognition of this casts a diﬀerent light on
both past performance and future prospects.
Obviously, this paper is no more than a preliminary analysis. Neverthe-
less, we hope that it may help to establish a research agenda that can enrich




There are three countries, and country-speciﬁc variables are denoted by
subscripts. The two sectors are manufacturing and agriculture, indicated by
superscripts. Proportion  of consumers’ expenditure goes on manufactur-
ing, the remainder on agriculture. Within each sector there are diﬀerenti-
ated products, and demands are derived from a subutility function (or price
index) taking the forms
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M is the number of industrial products and each country produces a
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berg transport costs. Values of demand for a product produced in country i
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Agriculture is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function using
each country’s endowment of land (set equal to 1), and an amount of labor.
The labor share in the production function is  . If Li and Li
M denote the to-
tal labor force and labor employed in manufacturing, respectively, then
agricultural output and the wage are
xi
A   (Li   Li
M) , w i   (Li   Li
M)  1
Manufacturing ﬁrms use labor and manufacturing to produce output, with
manufacturing share  . They therefore have price equal to
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Input demands can be found by Shephard’s lemma. In the perfect competi-
tion case ni|
M is exogenous, and quantities of each variety are given by de-
mand. In the monopolistic competition case ni
M is endogenous and adjusts
so that each ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts. Given an increasing returns-to-scale
technology, this occurs when it reaches a certain level of output, x, so we





Expenditure levels come from income (wage income and agricultural rent)
and from derived demands, according to
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Real wages are nominal wages deﬂated by the price index, (Gi
A)1– (Gi
M) .
Results are presented for   0.1,   0.3 and   0.35, and  A   20 and
 M 20 (perfect competition) or  M 6 (monopolistic competition). Trade
costs in the two sectors are equal, and the high level of the iceberg factor is
1.8, and the low level 1.475.
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Comment Richard E. Baldwin
Linking economic geography to the history of globalization is a good and an
old idea. Kuznets, Myrdal, and Rostow gave geography and agglomeration
forces center stage in their theories, but they lacked tools to formalize the
links.1 These were provided in the early 1990s with the emergence of the so-
called new economic geography. This paper by Crafts and Venables applies
this new approach to several aspects of the historical experience of global-
ization. Although this eﬀort is welcome, the outcome falls short of what one
could have hoped for given the towering contributions of the authors to eco-
nomic history on the one hand and economic geography on the other.
In the mid-1990s, Paul Krugman and Tony Venables formallyshowed that
“new” economic geography models provided a sweeping account of how
falling trade costs and agglomeration forces could explain the broad outline
of two centuries of global economic developments (the working title of their
paper was “History of the World: Part I”). The basic logic of the Krugman-
Venables story sparked great interest, but many found its mapping to histor-
ical data disturbingly vague. Crafts and Venables would be the perfect team
to shore up its historical underpinnings, but here their paper disappoints;
what we get are a few cursory and well-known facts on transport costs and,
separately, on global economic activity since the early nineteenth century.
Moreover, the authors focus a good deal of attention on the way eco-
nomic geography explains how the United States came to overtake other re-
gions in terms of income and output. They note that “following the relative
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1. For example, when it comes Rostow’s famous “growth take-oﬀ,” he writes that it “may
come about through a technological (including transport) innovation which sets in motion a
chain of secondary expansion in modern sectors and has powerful potential external economy
eﬀects which the society exploits” (1960, 36).and absolute decline of the Asian economies, the other main change in the
economic geography of the nineteenth-century world was the rise of the
New World, and within this the particular dominance of the United States.”
This focus on how the United States shouldered the United Kingdom out
of the number one spot, combined with a resolute disregard of continental
Europe, seems to reﬂect a very British view of the world.
The nineteenth-century rise of the United States’ economy was caused
by, and indeed could not have happened without, a growth take-oﬀ, so the
issue the authors are addressing is really the timing of growth take-oﬀs.
Geography clearly has a role to play in explaining the spread of modern
growth, but the U.S. experience must be seen in a broader context. The
emergence of modern growth, which is intimately associated with industri-
alization, ﬁrst occurred in Great Britain in the late eighteenth century
(Crafts 1995). After a signiﬁcant delay of a few decades, modern growth be-
gan in a series of other economies—all of which are close to the United
Kingdom in terms of transport costs. Belgium, France, and the United
States experienced industrialization and modern growth in the 1830s and
1840s, with Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Russia, and Canada joining
in the mid- to late 1800s. Keeping in mind that sea transport was much more
eﬃcient than land transport for much of this period, the centrality of geo-
graphy in this nineteenth-century saga just leaps oﬀ the page. The authors’
concentration on why the United States rather than Latin America became
the area that overtook the United Kingdom looks distinctly odd. Indeed,
Puga and Venables (1996) have a nice model of the spread of industrializa-
tion, which could have—with the straightforward addition of knowledge
spillovers and endogenous growth—been usefully applied to study the role
of geography in this key growth/industrialization question. This is just one
example of the contributions that this pair of authors could have made.
Grand Uniﬁed Theory of Globalization and Geography
Perhaps the biggest missed opportunity in this paper concerns what
might be called the grand uniﬁed theory of globalization and geography. All
the elements are lying around in the literature; Crafts and Venables would
have been the perfect pair to put them together. Before sketching out what
this might have looked like, allow me to stylize the main facts of globaliza-
tion since the mid-nineteenth century.
Globalization’s Five Famous Facts
The world has seen two waves of globalization: one from roughly 1850 to
1914, and one from the 1960s to the present. At a high level of abstraction
the key facts are as follows:2
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2. This section draws on Baldwin and Martin (2000), available as an NBER working paper
or at [http://heiwww.unige.ch/~baldwin/].• Industrialization/deindustrialization. In the ﬁrst wave, the “North”
(Western Europe and the United States) industrialized while the South
(especially India and China) deindustrialized. In the second wave, the
South (East Asia) industrializes while the North deindustrializes. 
• Divergence. The ﬁrst wave saw North and South incomes diverge mas-
sively, whereas the second wave witnesses a convergence, at least be-
tween the North and the industrializing South.
• Trade. International trade in goods and factors (labor migration and
long-term capital ﬂows) exploded in the ﬁrst wave. After being shut
down by two world wars, a surge of protectionism, and the Great De-
pression, the second wave has been marked by a return of trade and
capital ﬂows to levels that have recently topped those seen in Victorian
England. Mass international migration, however, remains small by the
standards of the ﬁrst wave.
• Growth take-oﬀ. Some time before the ﬁrst globalization wave kicked
in, the Industrial Revolution triggered modern growth in the North,
but the South continued to stagnate in per capita terms. Modern
growth—that is, a self-sustained growth process whereby output per
hour worked rises steadily year by year—began in the United King-
dom but spreads to western Europe and the United States around the
middle of the nineteenth century. Of course, this is not independent of
the income divergence since big diﬀerences in income levels come from
sustained diﬀerences in growth rates—not from one-time shifts of the
location of industry. Moreover, the limited income convergence in the
second wave is linked to spectacular growth in the industrializing
South and a moderate slowdown in the North.
• Urbanization. Whereas some of the largest cities in the world were in
the South prior to the nineteenth century, the ﬁrst globalization wave
is accompanied by a rapid and historically unprecedented urbaniza-
tion in the North. Northern urbanization continued during the second
wave, but cities grew even more rapidly in the South.
Accounting for the Facts: Economic Geography’s Say
The Krugman-Venables history of the world sews together the ﬁrst three
of the ﬁve facts. Here it is. In 1750 or so, the world’s economic geography
was quite homogenous—that is, poor and agrarian. With domestic and in-
ternational trade costs nearly prohibitive, each village essentially had to
make all its own goods; this meant manufactured goods were dear and the
available range of varieties limited. As trade costs fell, both inside and be-
tween nations, specialization became feasible, and this triggered a process
of what Myrdal (1939) called “cumulative causality.” Modeling this circu-
lar-causality process is the heart of the new economic geography’s contri-
bution, so an aside is in order. Migration of ﬁrms or workers dehomoge-
nizes the world, turning it into economically big and small regions
(markets). When industries are imperfectly competitive and trade is costly,
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gions, but since industries are marked by increasing returns, getting a dis-
proportionate share of industry means a region’s labor is disproportionately
productive, and this in turn results in higher real wages, a higher return to
capital, or both. The circle is closed by noting that capital and labor are at-
tracted to the region with higher rewards, and their migration makes the big
region bigger and the small region smaller.
According to Krugman and Venables, advances in transport technology
in the early nineteenth century triggered this dehomogenization of the
world’s economic geography, and, as history would have it, the North won
at the South’s expense. This single event is the root cause of the ﬁrst three
facts: Northern industrialization and Southern deindustrialization, the
rapid expansion of international trade (England becomes the world’s work-
shop, providing cheap and varied manufactured goods in exchange for raw
materials, and this specialization both fosters trade and is fostered by it),
and income divergence (due to increasing returns in industry and decreas-
ing returns in other sectors, a high share of industry in GDP means high la-
bor productivity and thus high incomes).
One problem with this story is that the magnitudes just do not ﬁt. One-
time concentrations of industry just cannot account for the observed in-
come gaps. Here is the argument. Krugman and Venables ignore endoge-
nous technological progress, assuming that physical technology is identical
in the North and South. Thus, in the Krugman-Venables story, the diﬀer-
ence in incomes between the United Kingdom and India must be due to the
diﬀerence in industry’s share in the U.K. and Indian output mix and the
productivity gap between industry and traditional sectors. If the United
Kingdom’s per capita income was 100 in 1850, India’s was 23 according to
Maddison (1995, tables C16 and D1), so the income gap to be explained is
77. Moreover, Crafts (1989, 417) tells us that in 1840, 47 percent of the U.K.
workforce was in industry, and Bairoch (1982, table 9) tells us that India was
only 4.7 percent as industrialized as the United Kingdom in 1860, so (ig-
noring the mismatch in dates) we can conclude that the static allocation of
industry can only account for the income diﬀerence if industrial workers are
171 times (i.e., 17,100 percent) more productive than workers in the tradi-
tional sector.
This just cannot be right. Plainly, the real story must lie elsewhere, and
growth is the obvious suspect. Indeed, since the headline story in the nine-
teenth century was the spread of modern growth, the Krugman-Venables
story is a bit like Hamlet with the Prince. Clearly, one has to add endoge-
nous growth to the Krugman-Venables story to account for the facts on in-
come divergence and convergence as well as on growth take-oﬀs.
Adding Endogenous Growth to Economic Geography Models
Fortunately, the literature combining economic geography and growth
models is fairly well developed (see, e.g., Baldwin and Forslid 1997; Martin
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taviano (2001) have used this combination of geography and growth to ac-
count for the ﬁrst four of globalization’s ﬁve famous facts.
The basic idea is quite simple and turns on the fact that transporting
ideas—as well as goods—is expensive, so that learning spillovers tend to be
localized geographically. Starting in the Krugman-Venables phase I, where
transporting goods is expensive and industry is thinly spread, growth does
not occur because the dispersion of industry prohibits a virtuous learning
and innovation cycle from starting. As the transport cost of goods falls, in-
dustry—and thus learning—gets geographically concentrated. Due to lo-
calized technological spillovers, industrial agglomeration in the North im-
plies that the South has no incentive to invest and innovate, while the
incentive to innovate in the North increases. In this way, industrial agglom-
eration not only generates industrialization and a growth take-oﬀ in the
North, but it also produces a massive income divergence.
Now, as we move on to the second wave of globalization, we presume that
the cost of transporting goods asymptotes toward some natural limit, but
additionally, and importantly, we assume that the cost of trading ideas de-
creases. At some point, this generates a rapid industrialization in the South
because the South is more easily able to beneﬁt from historical innovation
in the North and more easily able to access Northern markets. The emer-
gence of southern industry slows global growth somewhat (since it dis-
perses learning) and forces a relative deindustrialization in the North.
The only facts left unaccounted for concern urbanization. To get this into
the story, one would have to allow internal geography in the regions con-
sidered (Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano follow Krugman and Venables in
assuming that regions are just points in space), but once the technical diﬃ-
culties were mastered, the economics would be straightforward. In the ﬁrst
wave  of globalization, economic activity characterized by localized
spillovers is concentrating in the North. It would not therefore be too sur-
prising that urbanization proceeded faster in the North than in the South
during this era. Likewise, in the second wave of globalization, the industri-
alization of the South (emergence of the Asian tigers, etc.) strengthens the
forces that foster within-South concentration of economic activity (i.e., ur-
banization), while the deindustrialization of the North does the opposite.
These comments have, I hope, illustrated that the Crafts-Venables paper
is a small ﬁrst step in what should prove a very fruitful direction for re-
search.
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